Notes on oral arguments 1

2020-12-01

District Court of The Hague


Case number	C/09/571932 2019/379
Session	01 December 2020

the opening arguments (1)

in the matter of:

Vereniging Milieudefensie both on its own behalf, and in its capacity of representative ad litem and representative of the co-complainants who are listed on Annex A, which annex is attached to the summons and forms part thereof, having its registered office in Amsterdam, the Netherlands;
Stichting Greenpeace Nederland, having its registered office in Amsterdam, the Netherlands;
Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee, having its registered office in Harlingen, the Netherlands;
Stichting ter bevordering van de Fossielvrij-beweging, having its registered office in Amsterdam, the Netherlands;
Stichting Both ENDS, having its registered office in Amsterdam, the Netherlands;
Jongeren Milieu Actief, having its registered office in Amsterdam, the Netherlands;
Stichting ActionAid, having its registered office in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Claimants

Hereinafter also called: “Milieudefensie et al.”

Counsel:

Mr R.H.J. Cox
Mr. D.M.J. Dexters
Mr. A.J.M. van Diem
Mr. S.J. Keuls

Versus

Royal Dutch Shell plc
Having its registered office in The Hague, the Netherlands

Defendant

Counsel:

Mr. D. Horeman
Mr. J. de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk,
Mr. N.H. van den Biggelaar

Opening arguments

Your Honours,

Led by Vereniging Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth - Netherlands), seven non-governmental organisations and over 17,000 individual citizens summoned the company Royal Dutch Shell to appear before your court in April 2019.
The defendant company Royal Dutch Shell has its registered office in The Hague in the Netherlands and heads the international Shell group, a group of over one thousand companies which are active in a coordinated and integrated manner on the global oil and gas market. Under Royal Dutch Shell's management, the Shell group is globally active in the exploration, production, refining, marketing, purchase and sale of oil and gas.
Through its business activities and the sale of fossil fuels, the Shell group is annually responsible for approx. 1.2% of worldwide industrial greenhouse gas emissions. This makes the annual scope of emissions of the Shell group substantially greater than the emissions of the entire Dutch society – thus substantially greater than the emissions of all Dutch companies and all Dutch citizens together.
In terms of CO₂ emissions, the Shell group is the eleventh biggest industrial polluter in the world. The company belongs to the select group of 25 multinational companies which in the past 30 years have caused more than half of global industrial greenhouse gas emissions. The scope of the emissions connected with the Shell group is therefore relevant on a global scale, and is even considerably more relevant than the scope of the emissions of the Netherlands.¹
Royal Dutch Shell is not only in charge of one of the biggest polluting organisations in the world, it also intends to ensure that the Shell group remains one of the biggest polluters in the world. Royal Dutch Shell wants the Shell group to continue growing substantially in oil and gas production up to 2030. The related investment policy is so substantial that the Shell group together with the US oil and gas multinational ExxonMobil leads the global ranking of biggest investors in new oil and gas fields over the period to 2030.²
It is the claimants' opinion that the current and intended concern policy of Royal Dutch Shell is extremely hazardous and disastrous. The concern policy cannot in any way be reconciled with the global climate goal, to protect humankind, the human living environment and nature, to prevent a dangerous climate change.

If humankind and the human living environment are to be protected against the serious consequences of dangerous climate change, global greenhouse gas emissions will have to decrease very drastically by 2030, even almost halved .³
The concern policy of Royal Dutch Shell does not align with this global climate goal and consequently contributes to the realisation of a great risk to mankind, human rights, future generations, the environment and nature. The claimants therefore conclude that the concern policy of Royal Dutch Shell is on a collision course with global climate goals. In addition, Royal Dutch Shell also has an inhibitory effect on the climate policy of many nation states, a topic I will come back to later.
Because of the enormous dangers Royal Dutch Shell thus creates, the claimants assert that Royal Dutch Shell is acting wrongfully with regard to the claimants. They have therefore asked this District Court to put an end to this situation created by Royal Dutch Shell, which can be deemed dangerous, harmful and wrongful.
According to the claimants, the wrongful situation which has arisen must be addressed and eliminated by means of a court order instructing Royal Dutch Shell to reduce emissions. The result of this court order should be that Royal Dutch Shell must have drastically reduced the CO₂ emissions of the Shell group under its authority by 2030. In view of the related enormous risks, a concern organisation which has such an important influence on the course of global CO₂ emissions bears an individual and legally enforceable responsibility.
The claimants assert that this drastic emissions reduction, which Royal Dutch Shell is to achieve by 2030, is necessary to be able to achieve the central global goal of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. The central objective of the UN Climate Convention of 1992 is to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level at which dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system is prevented. The UN Climate Convention makes it clear that by preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, it is ensured that food production is not put at risk, that ecosystems can adapt to climate change in a natural manner and that sustainable economic development remains possible. All of this is in the interests of current and future generations of mankind.⁴
The 2015 Paris Agreement, which supplements the UN Climate Change Convention, clarifies what is needed to prevent this dangerous anthropogenic disruption of the climate system .It is necessary that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is limited to such a level that the average warming of the earth is limited to well below 2˚C and preferably to 1.5˚C because this will significantly limit the risks and consequences of climate change.⁵
In the opinion of the 196 states affiliated to the UN Climate Change Convention and the Paris Agreement, it is necessary on the basis of the best available (IPCC) science to achieve this Paris temperature target. This is necessary to see to it that the danger which accompanies climate change can be limited to a level whereby food production, the ecosystems and sustainable economic development remain protected on behalf of current and future generations. The Paris Agreement also sets out the additional position that achieving this temperature goal is also necessary to eliminate global poverty. ⁶
The fundamental importance of a liveable living environment applies to every person. Without a habitable living environment there cannot be the enjoyment of the inalienable human rights such as the right to life, the right to water and food and the right to a peaceful and healthy family life. These are fundamental values and interests which are laid down in various human rights treaties. Dangerous climate change affects these and other fundamental values and interests in many ways. In order to prevent this, it is of crucial importance that the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement is realised.
With the UN Climate Change Convention and the Paris Agreement, a universally supported and accepted safety standard has been established for the protection of people and the environment, a safety standard that aims to protect both the public interest and the individual interest. The public interest and individual interests therefore demand the prevention of dangerous climate change, by limiting global warming of the earth to well under 2˚C and preferably limiting it to 1.5˚C.
In addition to a legal meaning, this universally supported and accepted safety standard has a farther-reaching factual meaning between the contracting states. By means of the temperature goal based on scientific findings, the global community has established a danger threshold which may not be crossed in the interests of humankind and the environment. It is the claimants' opinion that said factual universal determination regarding the danger threshold which may not be exceeded, not only establishes obligations for state parties such as the State of the Netherlands but also for non-state parties such as Royal Dutch Shell.
As has already been explained in the summons, Royal Dutch Shell is well aware of the danger threshold and its exceptional role in causing the danger that is to be prevented. To date it has nevertheless failed to bring its concern policy in line with this universally accepted safety standard. Nor does it intend to do this on its own initiative, as it states year after year at its shareholders'meetings (most recently during the 2020 shareholders' meeting).⁷ That is the reason and motive that more than 17,000 citizens and the seven claiming non-governmental organizations are taking legal action against the danger that Royal Dutch Shell creates with its concern policy The claimants believe that Royal Dutch Shell has an obligation to observe the universally established danger threshold to protect all general and special interests which are threatened by the danger of climate change. The individual citizens are objecting to that danger because of their own interests and the seven non-governmental organisations are doing so because of the public interest.
The seven non-governmental organisations are five nature and environmental organisations and two humanitarian aid organisations. In addition to the leading litigant Vereniging Milieudefensie, the claimants encompass the following nature and environmental organisations: Stichting Greenpeace Nederland; Stichting ter bevordering van de Fossielvrij-beweging; Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and the association Jongeren Milieu Actief. The two humanitarian aid agencies are Stichting ActionAid and Stichting Both ENDS.
In the claimants' opinion, Royal Dutch Shell's failure to observe the global temperature goal as a universally applicable safety standard, has legal significance and legal consequences under national law. This legal significance applies both in the context of the social duty of care rooted in Article 162 Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) and in the context of human rights law.
That this international safety standard can entail obligations under national law, has already been determined in the Urgenda case against the State of the Netherlands. It is very important to determine in this respect that the order imposed on the State, in that case, to achieve an emissions reduction of 25% by 2020, does not ensue from a hard obligation pursuant to a convention. Nowhere in the UN Climate Convention and nowhere in the decisions of the annual UN climate conferences is it stated that the Netherlands commits itself to the other states to said reduction of at least 25%. The Netherlands and other states did acknowledge that from a scientific perspective such a minimum contribution would be necessary to make a credible contribution to the global temperature goal.
Even though the 25% reduction by 2020 is thus not a convention obligation for the State, in the light of the global standard to prevent dangerous climate change, the State is obliged to make this minimum contribution under national law. The order imposed on the State ensues from the interplay of, on the one part, the universal acknowledgement of the temperature goal as an international safety standard to prevent the realisation of significant factual danger and on the other the broad realisation that only by means of a minimum reduction of 25% in 2020 will the State make a proportional contribution to the prevention of that significant factual danger.
The fact that there is a universal consensus on the safety standard which may not be breached in order to prevent serious damage to humans and the environment, thus has independent legal meaning under national law and this independent meaning was attributed by the District Court, the Court of Appeal and the Netherlands Supreme Court. That independent meaning was then given concrete elaboration by application of the best available and broadly acknowledged scientific findings on what reduction percentages should be reached as of 2020.
The claimants believe that the universally applicable safety standard to prevent dangerous climate change, under national law not only has independent meaning for the legal obligations of the State of the Netherlands, but also for a party like Royal Dutch Shell. That Royal Dutch Shell is not a nation state and is thus not a contracting party of the UN Climate Convention or the Paris Agreement, is not normative in that respect. This has to do, on the one part, with the above-discussed factual meaning of the universal safety standard and on the other with the fact that it can be determined just as well for Royal Dutch Shell as for the State of the Netherlands that it satisfies all core criteria which are relevant for being able to establish liability under the heading of wrongful act in relation to the global climate danger. What is normative is that said core criteria show that Royal Dutch Shell has an important and even exceptional position and responsibility with regard to both the causing and the prevention of dangerous climate change.
In that respect the claimants pointed out in the summons (para. 41 et seq.) that they are of the opinion that it can be deduced from the Urgenda case that both a public and a private party in relation to the global climate problem can be expected to have a significant duty of care if the party in question satisfies five core criteria, being:
1. (i) that said party has for a long time been well aware of the great dangers and risks of climate change;
2. (ii) that said party has a sufficiently substantial part in global emissions, or in any event has a certain responsibility for that global part;
3. (iii) that said party is able to exert de facto control over the emissions in question;
4. (iv) that said party plays an important role in the transition to a sustainable society;
5. (v) that said party is able to take effective reduction measures without having to do the impossible;
Royal Dutch Shell as a party satisfies all five of these criteria, even more than the State of the Netherlands. There are not many commercial private parties in the world for which it can be said that they are directly and indirectly responsible for a bigger contribution to global emissions than the State of the Netherlands, but Royal Dutch Shell is one of them. Nor are there many companies in the world for which it can be said that they have a bigger individual influence on the global energy transition than Royal Dutch Shell. What is more, Royal Dutch Shell has more of a direct control over the CO₂ emissions connected with its group and its products than those which the State of the Netherlands has over the emissions of Dutch society. In addition, Royal Dutch Shell has been aware for a very long time of the great dangers connected with climate change and it has known for just as long how important its role is in preventing this danger. Royal Dutch Shell is also able to effectively set an alternative course which is in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement and without having to do the impossible. What Royal Dutch Shell needs to do to act in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement, can also be easily determined on the basis of best available and broadly supported scientific findings.
These five criteria and other relevant aspects will be touched upon in these oral arguments, which will run for several days, and the basics of the criteria have also already been discussed in the summons and the statement of 6 November last. However, for these opening arguments I would like to limit myself to a number of aspects which, in the light of Royal Dutch Shell's defence, must first be explained in supplementation of the summons. It is necessary to clarify these aspects now, so that there is a sufficiently logical basis for the following parts of the oral arguments.
This concerns first of all the further evidence for the third criterion mentioned above, i.e. that Royal Dutch Shell has control over the scope of the emissions of its group. I will also come to speak in this respect about the way in which Royal Dutch Shell, according to its own documentation, weighs up the company interests and the public interests against each other. It will appear that said weighing up of risks and the way in which Royal Dutch Shell acts, underline its important and exceptional role in the energy transition and justify it once again and make it necessary that RDS be ordered to reduce emissions.
Secondly, in these opening arguments I would like to make it clear that the United Nations and the 196 countries which are signatories to the UN Climate Convention, hold the view that the assistance of important non-state actors such as Royal Dutch Shell is important in order to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreements. In the coming 10 years global emissions must be reduced by almost 50% or in any event very substantially. An enormous task in other words. If important companies like Royal Dutch Shell do not themselves seek alignment with the goals of the Paris Agreement, the transition in the coming decade, the most important decade of the entire reduction task toward global net zero emissions, will probably not be able to succeed. Nation states cannot tackle this task on their own and have stated as much.
All other important topics will be discussed in the other parts of the multi-day oral arguments and they will further clarify the need for the requested order.
From now on I will refer to Royal Dutch Shell as RDS and the Royal Dutch Shell group as the Shell group. I will refer to the seven non-governmental organisations acting on behalf of the public interest collectively as "NGOs". Furthermore, I will by and large refer to the claimants collectively (i.e. the NGOs and the individual claimants collectively) as of this time for the sake of convenience as Milieudefensie et al. or Milieudefensie. I will ensure that no confusion arises on the part of the District Court on behalf of which claimant I am speaking in the event I discuss the position of individual NGOs or individual claimants.
I will now start with the first part of my oral arguments which clarify why RDS' concern policy is controlling and decisive for the scope of emissions of the Shell group.

RDS determines the climate and transition policy of the Shell group

That RDS is the head of the international Shell group and that it has the central management of that group, is not up for discussion.
According to RDS' statement, the Shell group comprises over 1,100 companies in dozens of countries. RDS is directly or indirectly the ultimate shareholder of these domestic and foreign group companies.⁸
RDS has stated that as the top holding company of the Shell group it directly or indirectly has a controlling interest in these domestic and foreign companies belonging to the Shell group.⁹ Because of this controlling interest RDS can set the general policy for the entire group, including the group's policy relating to the energy transition, as it states itself.¹⁰ The attitude of the Shell group in the energy transition is therefore something that is determined at the level of RDS.
RDS furthermore sets the guidelines for the entire Shell group, such as the business principles to be applied by the group companies, and RDS reports on the total greenhouse gas emissions of the Shell group – both on the scope 1 and 2 emissions and on the scope 3 emissions. RDS' reporting on the total greenhouse gas emissions of the Shell group takes place on the basis of the guidelines of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, which is worldwide the most commonly used protocol for charting CO₂ emissions of companies.¹¹
Because RDS is in charge of the central management of the international Shell group, has a controlling stake in all group companies and can therefore exercise dominant control over the group, it is obliged to draw up consolidated financial statements for the Shell group every year and to report on the group activities in its annual report.¹² RDS naturally does so. It ensues from this that Shell as a group is an economic and organisational unit which is led by RDS.
A large part of every annual report of RDS is formed by the RDS Strategic Report. This strategic report is preceded by statements of both the chairman and the CEO of RDS. It is then set out in detail what the concern strategy and direction is which RDS has in mind with regard to the Shell group. Just as in the preceding annual reports, the strategic report takes up some 100 pages in the 2019 annual report.
In the strategic report RDS clarifies, inter alia, what climate and transition policy it has in mind with the group. RDS also reports on the greenhouse gas emissions of the Shell group.
A similar annual report by RDS on greenhouse gas emissions and its climate and transition policy can be found in the RDS sustainability reports (the Sustainability Reports), on the Shell website and via the Carbon Disclosure Project of which Shell presents annual statements.¹³ The Carbon Disclosure Project is a project geared to, inter alia, making company emissions transparent.
The most recent statement which RDS made to the Carbon Disclosure Project dates from 2019. The most recently published RDS annual report also dates from 2019. Milieudefensie et al. has submitted both documents into the proceedings as Exhibit 315 and Exhibit 314 respectively. Both documents published by RDS provide a more detailed picture of the central management and control which RDS has over the Shell group, in particular in relation to its climate and transition policy.
Hereafter I will refer to the Carbon Disclosure Project as the CDP.
In the statement which Royal Dutch Shell made to the CDP in 2019, Royal Dutch Shell makes it clear that its CEO has ultimate accountability for the entire management of the Shell group. According to the statement, the CEO is the final authority and has final accountability in all management cases, except in those cases which fall under the final responsibility of the entire RDS management or fall under the domain of the RDS shareholders' meeting.¹⁴
In relation to climate change it is indicated in the CDP statement that the CEO of RDS is the most senior responsible person for the climate policy of the Shell group. This makes the CEO of RDS the person who must implement and realise the climate policy and the related strategy within the Shell group. I cite the CDP statement of RDS:

The CEO is the most senior individual with accountability for climate change. This includes the delivery of Shell's strategy, e.g. through Shell's plan's – as announced in December 2018 --to set short-term targets for reducing the Net Carbon Footprint of the energy products it sells [..].¹⁵
The short-term goals relating to the Net Carbon Footprint of the Shell products which RDS mentions in this quote, are the same as those which it explained in its statement of defence.¹⁶ Those emission reduction goals relate to the entire Shell group, which is led by the CEO of RDS.
The CDP statement shows that the climate policy for which the CEO has final accountability, is determined by the RDS board. The board is advised by a "Board-level committee".¹⁷ This committee which advises the RDS board is called the Corporate and Social Responsibility Committee, abbreviated to the CSRC.
The following is stated about the role of the CSRC (quote):

The role of the CSRC is to review and advise the Board on Shell's strategy, policies and performance in the areas of safety, environment, ethics and reputation [..] The topics discussed in depth included personal and process safety, road safety, the energy transition and climate change, Shell's Net Carbon Footprint ambition, the Company's environmental and societal license to operate, and its ethics programme.¹⁸
The topics energy transition and climate change, climate policy, ethics and the maintaining of societal legitimacy for the operating activities of the Shell group, are thus "front and center" on the agenda of the RDS board. These are not secondary issues, but primary issues for the board.
This is also why RDS states in the 2019 annual report that thriving in the energy transition and maintaining societal legitimacy for its operating activities are two of the three central pillars in its strategy for the future. The third central pillar is to make as much profit as possible, according to the annual report.¹⁹
In short: the RDS board, of which the CEO forms part, thus establishes the climate and transition policy for the entire Shell group. The concern board is advised in this respect by a special advisory committee. It is then the task and the responsibility of the CEO to lead the execution and implementation of the climate and transition policy within the Shell group.
Naturally it is the case that the policy in an operational sense must be executed and implemented by the operating companies within the Shell group. That is the evident difference between the activities of a holding company on the one part and the operating companies functioning under its management, supervision and control on the other.
However, this does not detract from the reality that the final accountability for the general and strategic policy of the Shell group, including the policy relating to the energy transition and the climate, lies with the RDS board and CEO. It should speak for itself that the party who bears final accountability on behalf of RDS for the execution of the group policy determined by RDS, is also in a position to have this policy implemented within the group. This also ensues from the controlling interest that RDS has directly and indirectly over the approx. 1,100 group companies.
It also speaks for itself that these kinds of large and overarching topics for the Shell group, such as the energy transition and the approach to the climate problem, fall under the responsibility, control, management and coordination of RDS as holding and parent company. RDS determines how much is invested annually by the Shell group and in what activities and energy portfolio the Shell group invests.
For example, RDS describes in its CDP statement on p. 42 under the heading "Capital expenditures/capital allocation" that under its management the annual group investments have been reduced from $ 46 billion in 2013 to $ 24 billion in 2017. RDS furthermore makes it clear that since 2017 it chose for a bandwidth of annual investments of between $ 25 and 30 billion. RDS then goes on to say that it intends to invest an amount of $ 1 to 2 billion of this annual investment amount in its New Energies operating division.
In short, RDS determines the annual investment amount and determines where the investment priorities lie. It determines whether annually an amount of 1 billion or 10 billion will be invested in new energy sources.
In connection with this RDS also determines what activities will see divestments. Divestment means the decision to terminate, phase out or reverse investments in certain operating activities. This can entail, for example, that subsidiaries are reorganised or liquidated by RDS or that subsidiaries are sold by RDS to third parties, whether or not in a downsized form.
In the CDP statement under the heading "Acquisitions and divestments" RDS writes about its divestment policy (quote):

We have reshaped and refined our portfolio through our divestment programme. Our $30 billion divestment programme for 2016-18 made good progress in 2017 and finally completed in 2018 with investments made in a disciplined manner.²⁰
A good example of the divestment by RDS has already been discussed in the Milieudefensie et al. summons, i.e. the divestment which RDS implemented in the period between 2007 and 2009. In that period, under the management of the then CEO of RDS, Mr Jeroen van der Veer, it was decided to divest in the area of sustainable energy activities which RDS had built up within the Shell group until that time.²¹
In that same period RDS then had the Shell group change course by, in addition to divesting in areas of sustainable energy, focusing on new investments in very polluting oil sand and shale oil fields. In other words, a 180 degree turn. Milieudefensie et al. has described this in greater detail in the summons.²²
RDS thus determines with its investment policy in what degree it develops which energy products within the group and thereby thus also determines the current and future energy portfolio of the Shell group.
RDS even takes these decisions at project level, according to the annual report, in which the following can be read:

Selected assets were divested in 2019 [..] An example divestment is the sale of the Martinez refinery based in California, which was fully completed in February 2020 [..] Given the size of the Martinez asset, the sale was discussed by the Board. The divestment aligned with Shell's strategy to reshape refining efforts towards a smaller, smarter refining portfolio focused on further integration with Shell Trading hubs, Chemicals, and Marketing.²³
In the CDP statement RDS makes it clear that its investment decisions regarding the energy portfolio are weighed up against the potential consequences of the energy transition. RDS says the following about this in the CDP statement (quote):

[W]e assess our portfolio decisions, including divestments and investments, against potential impacts from the transition to lower-carbon energy. These include higher regulatory costs linked to carbon emissions and lower demand for oil and gas.²⁴
By making investments and divestments RDS is thus looking at, inter alia, the potential negative impact of a decreased demand for oil and gas as a result of the energy transition and at the increase in costs due to new regulations. I will come back to this weighing up and assessment by RDS of the energy transition and the concomitant risks for it in a moment.
The central control of RDS relating to portfolio decisions and investment decisions, both in general and in relation to the energy transition and the climate policy to be implemented, also necessarily follows from RDS' public accountability as a listed company via its annual report and consolidated financial statements toward, inter alia, its financiers, investors and private shareholders.
RDS must therefore provide transparency in its annual report, inter alia about the risks which are connected with investing in the activities of the Shell group. RDS must also be transparent about the management structures which it applies within the group to manage the relevant risks. In this manner RDS is showing the outside world how it identifies, manages and controls the group, the group activities and the related risks. In the CDP statement RDS asserts in this respect, inter alia:

Climate change and risks resulting from GHG emissions have been identified as a significant risk factor for Shell and are managed in accordance with other significant risks through the Board and Executive Committee. Shell's processes for identifying, assessing, and managing climate-related issues are integrated into our overall multi-disciplinary company-wide risk identification, assessment and management process. Shell frequently monitors and assesses climate-related risks looking at different time horizons; short (up to 3 years), medium (three years up to around 10 years) and long term (beyond around 10 years). Shell has a climate change risk management structure in place which is supported by standards, policies and controls [..]²⁵
The RDS concern management thus applies group-wide multidisciplinary identification and management processes to keep control of the group activities and the related risks. The risks connected with the CO₂ emissions of the group are assessed for the short, medium and long term. This again shows how far the leadership, steering and control of RDS over the Shell group reaches and that the Shell group is an economic and organisational unit which is centrally and tightly run by RDS.
This far-reaching leadership, steering and control of the group is also necessary to be able to retain the trust of investors. This trust would quickly disappear if RDS did not have that central leadership and group companies could easily get out from under RDS' control.
It would also be strange if the CEO in the presentation of the annual figures or at some other time makes statements about a new course to be set by the group (something investors on the stock exchange often usually respond to) if the CEO were not at all in a position to have the Shell group change course.
In September of this year, RDS through its CEO announced a reorganisation within the group, due to the falling oil and gas prices as a result of the corona crisis. The goal in this respect is reducing the worldwide labour force of 83,000 by more than 7,000 persons. RDS can announce this because it is also in charge of that worldwide reorganisation. It has the position and control within the Shell group to do so. Part of this specific reorganisation is that RDS wishes to be able to exercise a much more direct influence on the group companies by removing several management layers from the group companies. Mr Van Beurden says about this in a statement:

We have the feeling that at too many places there are too many layers between me as top official and the technicians at our locations.²⁶
The foregoing shows that RDS has the control and leadership over the Shell group. Because of that control and because of the fact that it determines the climate and transition policy within the concern, as well as making the related investment and portfolio decisions, it can and must be held accountable for its concern policy and the related CO₂ emissions.
I will now come back to the weighing up and assessment by RDS of the energy transition and the related risks thereof for RDS. As discussed above, RDS weighs up and assesses its concern policy and the related investment decisions against the energy transition and it takes account in this respect of, inter alia, higher costs due to climate regulations and the drop in demand for oil and gas products.
In the summons extensive attention has already been paid to the knowledge which Shell has had since at least the 1980s and 1990s with regard to the great risks of climate change which it has a hand in causing. It has been touched upon in this respect that Shell already foresaw and stated in 1998 that it could in the future face legal action if it failed to take climate action. At the time Shell already drew the conclusion that this could have material consequences for the company. A year later, Shell therefore announced that it would move away from oil and gas, but the decision was reversed a few years later by the then new CEO of RDS, Mr. Jeroen van der Veer.²⁷
Looking at its CDP statement and its 2019 annual report, it is clear that RDS was more than ever highly aware of the fact that its climate and transition policy could be blocked by lawsuits and new regulations, with reduced possibilities for oil and gas production as a consequence. In addition to what has already been quoted above, RDS says the following about this in the CDP statement:

Rising climate change concerns have led and could lead to additional legal and/or regulatory measures which could result in project delays and cancellations, a decrease in demand for fossil fuels, potential litigation and additional compliance obligations. If we are unable to find economically viable, as well as publicly acceptable solutions that reduce our GHG emissions and/or GHG intensity for new and existing projects, we could experience additional costs or financial penalties, delayed or cancelled projects, and/or reduced production and reduced demand for hydrocarbons, which could have a material adverse effect on our earnings, cash flows and financial condition.²⁸
RDS knows and is thus well aware – and has been for a long time – that its group policy can come under fire on many sides and that if this risk materialises, this can have a great impact on its earnings model, its cash flow and its general financial condition. RDS' investors and shareholders also know this, because the CDP statement is a public document. As per usual these risks were also included in the RDS annual report.²⁹
That RDS is nevertheless willing to accept these risks has to do with the fact that to achieve high returns, in general it is necessary to sail a little closer to the wind. In jargon this is called "risk appetite" i.e. the desire to accept risks. RDS also uses this word to explain why it accepts certain risks connected with its concern policy. RDS has the following to say about this in its 2019 Annual Report:

There are also risks that Shell accepts or does not seek to fully mitigate. The Executive Committee and the Board regularly consider group-level risks and associated control mechanisms. Shell has developed a risk appetite framework that considers three distinct factors: Strategic Risk Appetite, Operational Risk Appetite and Conduct Risk Appetite. These three factors aim to capture the range and variety of risks affecting Shell, with specific risk appetite parameters identified and monitored for each one.³⁰
RDS says with regard to its Strategic Risk Appetite that it specifically relates to the risks which are connected with the choices which it makes with regard to its current and future energy portfolio (quote):

Strategic Risk Appetite is about current and future portfolio considerations [..] It also considers "long range" developments in order to test key assumptions or beliefs in relation to energy markets.³¹
The climate and transition policy that RDS implements for the Shell group therefore has a specific Strategic Risk Appetite, a specific desire to accept strategic risks. This appetite for strategic risks is based on RDS' own estimation and beliefs regarding the long-term future of the various energy markets.
RDS also realises, however, that it can incorrectly estimate the future developments in the various energy markets and that if this is the case, its group policy comes with considerable risks. RDS also mentions this in its annual reports and Shell's investors are thus also familiar with these strategic risks.
In the 2019 Annual Report, this lawsuit is addressed by RDS as a risk for the Shell group as well as a number of other climate cases which have been brought in the United States. RDS says with regard to the risk connected with these climate cases (quote):

Management believes the outcome of these matters should be resolved in a manner favorable to Shell, however, there remains a high degree of uncertainty regarding the ultimate outcome of these lawsuits, as well as their potential effect on future operations, earnings, cash flow and Shell's financial condition.³²
RDS, its investors and all other parties financially involved with the Shell group thus know that due to the enormous quantities of CO₂ emissions which are and will be connected with RDS' strategic concern policy, RDS will run material risks. They all also know that the risks connected with CO₂ emissions come from many sides: from accelerated introduced climate regulations to the loss of societal support for its operating activities; and of a reduced demand for fossil fuels to potentially successful climate lawsuits such as this one.
Nevertheless, they are and remain willing to take these material risks of financial losses. This weighing up is an inherent part of the Strategic Risk Appetite mentioned by RDS. RDS weighs up the potential return on oil and gas activities against the financial risks which are connected with the excess in CO₂ emissions emitted by the group and the related risks which have been mentioned above. The result of that weighing up is that RDS (with the consent of its investors) has continued with the annual investment of tens of billions of dollars in new oil and gas activities, even though they know this is not in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement.
I have come to speak of this topic because RDS, in the weighing up of its investment decisions, assesses whether those investments are responsible in the framework of the energy transition. This is in the context of the overall control which RDS has over the group investments and the shaping of the group's energy portfolio. This is also how it determines the related climate and transition policy. I will briefly come back to this point in the context of the discussion of Exhibit 319 because this exhibit forms additional proof for RDS' control over the Shell group which is being discussed here.
For the moment I am concluding that Milieudefensie et al. has already satisfactorily demonstrated that RDS, through its strategic concern policy, has the control over the Shell group as well as the decisions which are decisive for the scope of the CO₂ emissions emitted by the Shell group.
In addition, the above provides some background on the risk considerations which RDS makes in determining its transition policy. That background makes it clear why RDS, and its shareholders and investors, willingly and knowingly are willing to accept the financial risks which will be the result of RDS' strategic choice not to act in line with the global temperature goals of the Paris Agreement.

Making identified transition risks manageable by means of such things lobby and PR activities

The identification and then weighing up of identified risks is only the first step of the concern policy and risk management to be implemented by RDS. After the risk considerations have been made, the risks which remain connected with the policy choices which have been made are subject to further management.
As can be read in any manual on risk management, as of the time that risks are identified, the management will have to focus on keeping those risks manageable. This by, on the one part reducing the chance that the identified risks will actually occur and, if they should nevertheless occur, that the risks have as little impact as possible on the business model which is followed.
This risk management is carried out by multinational companies and industries as standard through lobby activities, among other activities. John Ruggie of Harvard University wrote a publication about the lobbying power of multinational companies in 2018 which Milieudefensie et al. has introduced into the proceedings as Exhibit 273.
The District Court will be familiar with the name John Ruggie. He is the person behind the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights. John Ruggie established these UN Guiding Principles in consultation with governments, companies and NGOs. The UN Guiding Principles were established in 2011 with the support of the UN Human Rights Council. They serve to embed and elaborate the basic principle that, apart from States, businesses also have independent obligations to prevent a violation of human rights. Many large companies, including RDS, have committed to the UN Guiding Principles. Milieudefensie et al. went into a number of these points in detail in the summons.³³
In his 2018 publication John Ruggie refers to more than 100 scientific and institutional publications and studies. On the basis thereof he comes to the conclusion that multinational companies spend enormous amounts on political lobbying and through their lobby activities have significant political power and influence on laws and regulations.³⁴ He furthermore points out that due to globalisation Brussels and Washington in particular have become true magnets for lobby activities of multinational companies. His conclusion is that multinational companies have a substantial influence on these political and regulatory centres of the world, while ordinary citizens have virtually no influence on the decision-making processes which take place in these centres. It is not only citizens who cannot combat this lobbying power, neither can trade unions and NGOs. Ruggie points out in this respect that research shows that companies collectively spend 30 times as much money on lobby practices as the expenditure of trade unions and the NGOs put together.³⁵
RDS annually spends millions on lobby activities to influence laws and regulations and thus mitigate the risks of its strategic choices. This appears, inter alia, from the exhibit which RDS itself submitted into the proceedings as Exhibit RO-90. It is the document entitled "Industry Associations Climate Review". On page 7 of this Industry Associations Review, RDS indicates that for the year 2017 it spent a round amount of 8 million dollars on lobby activities in the United States and an amount of 5 million dollars in Europe. In total in 2017, in one single year, RDS spent an amount of 13 million dollars in these two regions of the world alone on lobby activities.³⁶
This is no different with other large multinationals, as appears, inter alia, from an article in the British newspaper The Guardian of 2019, which Milieudefensie et al. has submitted into the proceedings as Exhibit 329. This article makes it clear that research has shown that the five biggest oil and gas companies in the world, including RDS, in the period between 2010 and 2018 have collectively spent € 123 million on lobby activities in Brussels. These five companies alone are therefore able to put such an enormous amount on the table to secure their own interests and consequently nip the risks of climate change and the energy transition they are facing in the bud or otherwise mitigate them.³⁷ This alone shows the special influence which parties like RDS have on the climate policy and the energy transition.
However, the interests of RDS and the other four oil and gas companies are not protected by just themselves, but also via the many institutionalised industry associations of which they are a member. According to the Industry Associations Review of RDS, RDS, together with other oil and gas companies, is a member of at least 19 industry associations which represent the interests of the oil and gas sector in political centres such as those of Washington and Brussels.³⁸ Shell is on the board of five of those industry associations.³⁹
The article in The Guardian shows that in that same period from 2010 to 2018 the industry associations for the oil and gas industry have spent an additional amount of € 128 million on lobby activities in Brussels. This brings the total lobby budget to an amount of € 251 million. In eight years time five companies and their industry associations thus spent a quarter of a billion euros to secure the interests of the oil and gas industry in Brussels. The special influence on laws and regulations which arises from such substantial lobby activities, naturally delays the climate policy and the energy transition.
The research to which The Guardian refers shows that these companies and their lobbyists on average sit down with top EU officials more than once a week and that consequently they manage to stop, delay and water down intended laws and regulations from the EU.⁴⁰
RDS is active in the same manner in other parts of the world along with fellow oil and gas companies and industry associations. It is not unimportant to mention in this respect that a statement of RDS shows that the industry associations of which it is a member, are primarily active in the richest most developed regions of the world, like the EU, the United States, Canada and Australia.⁴¹ This is an important fact that I will come back to.
In the other relevant political centres of the world naturally equally large sums of money are being spent by these five oil and gas companies. Other research from 2019 shows in this respect that worldwide Shell spends approx. 50 million euros a year to exert influence on policy and regulations. This money is spent on, inter alia, direct lobby activities and on the financing of industry associations.⁴²
John Ruggie's conclusion that research shows that the lobbying power of multinational companies in the political centres of the world is large and substantial, is thus certainly not exaggerated. He concludes in this respect:

"In sum, lobbying is a standard form by means of which business exercises instrumental power. There is more of it in major centers of governance with international influence, be it Washington or Brussels"⁴³

Ruggie points out that threatening legal proceedings and actual litigation against regulatory bodies has become a standard lobby activity of multinationals to stop or water down regulations. He has the following to say about this:

"[I]f business loses at the legislative level, legal actions against regulators (national, regional , and global) has become a routine extension of lobbying."⁴⁴

Through their lobby activities, companies put pressure on the regulatory initiatives of states or state unions like the EU in all kinds of ways. They also have access to the right high-ranking officials. This will not be a surprise for anyone. We were able to find out ourselves in 2018 in the Netherlands that companies like Shell and Unilever have direct access to the mobile phone of our Prime Minister. This came out following the abolition of the dividend tax in the Netherlands, which was proposed by Shell and Unilever, which in 2018 led to the necessary political commotion. One reason for the commotion was the fact that the matter had not formed a part of the election programme of any of the political parties but nevertheless became an important part of the cabinet governing agreement. This took place under pressure of, inter alia, Shell and Unilever which after years of lobbying relating to the abolition of dividend tax that they wanted, now finally wanted Prime Minster Rutte to come up with the goods.⁴⁵ The political influence and power of multinational companies should not be underestimated. In the case of the dividend tax that power has become visible, but usually we see nothing of it, and it takes place behind the scenes.
These kinds of lobby practices are management measures for RDS to mitigate the risks identified by RDS and to bend policy and regulations to their will as much as possible. This is also what happens with the risk identified and accepted by RDS relating to the future regulation concerning climate policy and the energy transition. With regard to this point RDS has a considerable strategic risk appetite and can permit itself to have such, as it knows that it, together with other companies and industry associations from the oil and gas sector, has an adequate degree of control over the energy transition and the speed and shape in which it will take place. This shows that RDS has a special and important role in both the causing of dangerous climate change and in still being able to prevent it. This special position is important in the assessing of the wrongfulness, which will be discussed in greater detail on day 3 of these multi-day oral arguments. I have not, however, finished with the explanation of RDS' special position.
In addition to lobby activities, RDS is also deploying other effective management measures against climate policy and the energy transition. Another important way in which RDS holds a degree of control over initiatives for climate-related laws and regulations is by means of media campaigns. This appears from a US/Canadian study published in 2019. This study builds on dozens of earlier publications and studies and on the basis thereof charts how RDS and four other large oil and gas companies in the period from 1986 to 2015 used media campaigns in the United States and for what purpose. Milieudefensie et al. submitted this study as Exhibit 324.
The outcome of the study is that media campaigns by RDS and the four other oil and gas companies are particularly deployed at the time that regulatory initiatives relating to climate change come before the US Congress and at the time that there is a lot of media attention for climate change. In this way, according to the research, attempts are being made to increase the trust in these five companies among legislative and regulatory authorities so that regulatory initiatives are avoided as much as possible, and their business model is left unchanged as much as possible. I will quote from the study's conclusion:

The data clearly indicates that the level of promotional effort by major oil companies directly corresponds to levels of congressional action and media coverage related to climate change. As the perceived level of threat of legislative or regulatory action increases or increased adverse media coverage, major oil companies will expand their efforts to improve their corporate reputation. This effort aims at increasing the perceived legitimacy of these corporations, and in the process, decrease the possibility of regulations or legislation that would change its business operating procedures.⁴⁶
To gain trust and create loyalty in society, the companies then make use of two types of campaigns. The first is "issue advertising" through which the companies try to set the narrative for societal issues through public campaigns by presenting their own solutions for the societal issue as accurate, valid and in the public interest.⁴⁷ Examples were given of this in the summons, such as the campaign in which Shell claimed that investing in tar sand oil is in the interests of future generations and helps in combating climate change. Or the RDS campaign that natural gas is clean and that there is enough for the next 250 years.⁴⁸
The other kinds of campaigns the study refers to is "image advertising". These are the advertisements which in a general sense are to improve the legitimacy and the reputation of the companies so that the companies continue to enjoy significant trust and loyalty. These are the campaigns which in a general sense must express that the companies are socially responsible parties which look beyond their own economic gain.⁴⁹ For example, we all know the campaigns of the past under the slogan "Shell helps" in which Shell is positioned as the reliable party and helpful partner which can satisfy all consumer desires relating to mobility.⁵⁰ This is thus an example of image advertising according to the study.
The idea behind these kinds of campaigns is, according to this study, that someone who is well-known to the public cannot be an enemy of the public. Familiarity and reputation help establish trust and loyalty, on the part of regulators, investors, employees, consumers and other stakeholders of the company.⁵¹ This is apparently how the human psyche works. The PR agencies engaged by RDS know this better than anyone and make skilful use of this on RDS' instruction.
It is therefore essential to start imprinting the company name and creating brand recognition as early as possible. RDS knows this as well. That is why young children are specifically made familiar with the Shell company name and logo. This appears, inter alia, from the partnership that Shell had for fifty years, until recently, with Lego to promote the company among young children.⁵² Shell also specifically focuses on influencing young adults by means of attractive internet campaigns with slogans like "The future is bright, the future is gas", with the goal of convincing the young generation that natural gas is contemporaneous and hip and green, as has been set out in one of the exhibits which has been submitted.⁵³
RDS needs no lessons on how PR campaigns are used for reputation management. The fact that the Shell brand is one of the most well-known brands in the world, speaks volumes. This still brings great loyalty and great trust toward RDS in society. This broad trust in the company is then used in all kinds of ways to wrong-foot society and consequently delay tackling climate change and the energy transition. I will come back to this with a telling example shortly.
In all of this it must not be forgotten that according to RDS' own statement every day worldwide over 30 million people visit 45,000 Shell petrol stations.⁵⁴ On an annual basis this means 11 billion visitors. Thus at its own 45,000 petrol station locations in the world alone, which by the way is the biggest distribution network of all oil and gas companies⁵⁵, RDS has a good 11 billion customer contacts a year. This means 11 billion opportunities to create trust and loyalty on the part of people and to convince people of RDS' social image. A great deal of money is set aside for those campaigns every year. Shell spent a budget of no less than US$ 55 million on worldwide marketing activities in 2018.⁵⁶ Once again, enormous amounts are involved.
Against this background it is also easier to understand why Exxon Mobil, which works with comparable annual PR budgets⁵⁷, says that it is able by means of its PR campaigns to change the collective subconscious, in a way in which people collectively change their perception in favour of the company.⁵⁸ You could call it fascinating if it were not so shocking that this is the way in which the richest and most powerful companies in the world seek to influence the collective subconscious in a targeted manner and in fact manage to influence the collective subconscious.
The researchers therefore conclude that the PR campaigns of the five oil and gas companies which were studied are very slick propaganda campaigns which are specifically intended to give the public and the political elite the idea that the oil and gas companies are socially responsible companies, which voluntarily take action in the area of climate change and therefore do not have to be regulated.⁵⁹ According to the researchers these well thought-out campaigns are important obstacles as to why meaningful climate action is not making headway. Their conclusion is therefore:

Sophisticated propaganda campaigns designed to manipulate public and elite perception of the major oil companies are a significant barrier to meaningful climate action⁶⁰
RDS intends to keep making annual investments worth 20 to 30 billion in oil and gas activities for the coming 10 years. It even wants to expand these fossil activities in 2030 from 22% to 38%.⁶¹ For the coming 10 years there will thus be no emissions reduction in an absolute sense. Nor does RDS have a goal in this respect. In addition, it refuses to commit once and for all to the reduction in absolute scope of the CO₂ emissions connected with the concern and its products. This year too RDS again firmly rejected the shareholders' resolution related to this matter.⁶²
In short: the policy and interest of RDS remains for the future too evidently geared towards increasing demand for oil and gas, the protection of its oil and gas investments and the protection of its fossil business model. The logical consequence of this is that it will continue to protect its fossil business model via directed lobby activities and PR campaigns against the risks of stricter and accelerated climate policy. All of this shows once again the special position which RDS has in both the causing of and being able to prevent dangerous climate change.
I would now like to explain the methods and arguments which RDS uses against states to protect its business model on the basis of a concrete and recent example. This further makes it clear for this District Court why RDS dares to hold onto a specific strategic risk appetite when it comes to the choices for its energy portfolio and why awarding the claim of Milieudefensie et al. is so very important.
The way in which RDS independently and via its group companies sees to it that new climate regulations will not have a big impact on its business model, can be read in the statement which Shell Oil Company, a US subsidiary of RDS, gave in July 2019 to the US Committee on Energy and Commerce. The relevant statement has been submitted into the proceedings as Exhibit 319. The statement was given in connection with the plan launched by this US Committee to have created a 100% clean US economy as of 2050. The Committee wants to know from Shell and other stakeholders how they can best achieve this 2050 goal, inter alia so that it can take this into account in the further development of regulatory proposals.
The statement of Shell Oil Company is interesting for two reasons at this time.
First of all, because this statement again shows that subsidiaries of RDS, such as in this case Shell Oil Company, cannot have their own vision of the energy and climate policy of the Shell group. Shell Oil Company may only present the vision of RDS to this US Committee with regard to this point. This is made clear in the following words in the statement of Shell Oil Company:

Shell Oil Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, plc. Where "Shell" and/or Shell policies, positions or preferences are referenced in this response, the reference refers to Royal Dutch Shell, plc⁶³
The statement which the US subsidiary of RDS presents to the US Committee is thus not its own statement but that of RDS. This thus fits fully with the picture that RDS dictates the entire climate and transition policy of the Shell group and has the central management thereover.
Secondly, RDS, through its US subsidiary, is making known what it specifically requests the Committee to pay attention to in the event of the introduction of a CO₂ pricing mechanism in the United States. In that respect RDS informed the Committee as follows: RDS asserts that the CO₂ reduction goal connected with that mechanism must be reasonable; RDS asserts that a CO₂ price can lead to a loss of jobs and a loss of the gross domestic product as a result of the loss of competitive power; RDS asserts that a CO₂ price carries the risk that CO₂-intensive companies will relocate their activities abroad; RDS asserts that this risk of departure of CO₂-intensive companies can best be combated by compensating the relevant companies for the fact that they will have to deal with a CO₂ price.⁶⁴
On behalf of RDS various alternatives were presented to the US Committee which could be used as compensation for CO₂-intensive companies. For example, making emissions rights available to CO₂-intensive companies free of charge, the complete exemption of certain companies from emission rights, building in ceilings so that the CO₂ price does not become too high, the building in of ceilings so that the reduction goal does not become too high and lastly the adjustment of the tax system so that what is paid by these companies in CO₂ price on the one part, can be compensated again via a fiscal route on the other side.⁶⁵
The American Shell companies themselves are of course among the CO₂-intensive companies that RDS refers to in this statement through Shell Oil Company. RDS is hereby saying in a diplomatic manner that Shell will have to be compensated for the CO₂ pricing because RDS might otherwise relocate Shell activities to other countries. In essence these kinds of statements thus encompass covert threats, i.e.: do not regulate us too strictly, do not regulate us too rapidly and see to it that we as a company are not inconvenienced too much as otherwise, we might leave for another country where we will be regulated less strictly or on better conditions.
What Milieudefensie et al. means to indicate with this is that there is a big difference between what RDS often announces in public statements, i.e. that it warmly embraces the idea of CO₂ pricing, and what reservations and conditions the company then presents to states to be affected as little as possible by a CO₂ pricing. Publicly the impression is created that the organisation will easily and willingly be regulated but in practice this is really a completely different story. The other oil and gas companies act in precisely the same manner, this appears from research.⁶⁶
To top it off, RDS presents this diplomatically phrased threat to relocate in its statement to the Committee as a carbon leakage which will not help the climate. After all, if Shell relocates its US activities to Mexico this will not have improved the climate, but the United States will have lost the operating activities of Shell with the consequent loss of jobs and loss of gross domestic product. RDS advances the argument of carbon leakage as if it were a law of nature over which it has no influence whatsoever, but the reality is, of course, that RDS itself decides whether to penalize or reward nation states by relocating activities for taking climate action.
This is the way in which companies like RDS have blocked regulatory initiatives of national states for decades. This is precisely what the governance gap discussed in the summons is about, which was mentioned by the UN Human Rights Council as background for the establishing of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.⁶⁷ If because of this governance gap it is so difficult to regulate companies in a globalised economy, companies will have to engage in self-regulation themselves. This is the central thought behind the UN Guiding Principles, to which principles and underlying thoughts Shell has committed itself.
Because RDS has been playing this negotiation game with nation states for more than 100 years, it knows better than anyone how to put states under pressure and keep them under pressure in a diplomatic manner. That is why RDS dares to continue full steam ahead in terms of further growth in oil and gas production. For the same reasons other oil and gas companies (with the odd exception) continue to focus on growth in oil and gas production.
RDS and its fellow oil and gas companies know that together they form a large power block against regulatory initiatives of nation states. This entails that they are willing to accept the risks of accelerated regulation as part of their strategic risk appetite. They know that they have the position to combat new regulations, or determine the tempo of the regulations and they also know better than anyone how to avoid the impact of new regulations as best and as long as possible on their own operating activities.
It is in this context that the summons discussed the open letter from RDS of 2014 in which it is openly stated that RDS anticipates that the Shell activities will not be regulated, or not properly and not quickly enough to be able to prevent dangerous climate change.⁶⁸ RDS would never dare draft such a letter now because it has shown its cards more than it wanted, in overly undiplomatic words, but that letter does show how RDS views the world from the position of an economic super power and also shows the almost unassailable position it believes it holds.
Milieudefensie et al. cannot emphasise enough how shrewdly and diplomatically these kinds of strategies must be played out by the big companies with regard to nation states and other public authorities. Companies know that if politicians are sensitive to anything, it is the threat of departure of large multinational companies abroad. We also see this recur regularly in the Netherlands.
The use of this pressure tool has turned out to be very effective in the past decades, one of the important reasons why we have had a UN Climate Convention for almost 30 years and the climate problem has only been increasing to this day. Naturally the contracting states themselves have their own responsibility, but the negative influence of companies like RDS on the state approach to the climate problem is equally evident.
The result of awarding Milieudefensie et al.'s claim would be, inter alia, that the counter-pressure which RDS can exert with regard to climate-regulating states will decrease because the Shell group will have to reduce emissions no matter what, wherever the companies are located in the world. There are far fewer incentives for RDS to put nation states under pressure because wherever RDS would want to relocate its subsidiaries over the world, the reduction task for the Shell group will continue to exist. It will no longer be possible to avoid this. There will thus no longer be any carbon leakage, at least not by RDS.
By means of what has been discussed up to now, Milieudefensie et al. has wanted to show how RDS, and other oil and gas companies have tried to (significantly) slow down the transition movement in the past few decades. The summons and the statement of 6 November discuss the many ways in which RDS has done this.⁶⁹
If the biggest multinational oil and gas companies like RDS still refuse to act in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement and continue to use their special position and influence to the detriment of a drastic acceleration of the climate policy and the energy transition, it is evidently impossible in the coming 10 years to achieve the necessary drastic reduction in global CO₂ emissions. The reverse also applies: if large multinational polluters like RDS use their influence in favour of the climate approach, the necessary energy transition will also be possible as well. I will get back to this.

The important role of non-state parties under the UN climate regime

The 196 countries which are signatories to the UN Climate Convention agree that, parallel to their own national efforts, it is of great importance that the private sector too, as non-state party, pro-actively and independently bring about a reduction in emissions. If this does not happen, it is not realistic to expect that dangerous climate change can be prevented. Milieudefensie et al. believes this is an important point to clarify so that it becomes clear that the CO₂-intensive companies will also truly independently and proactively have to come into action if the goals of the Paris Agreement are to be reasonably achievable.
What I will now explain in this context can be read in the international handbook on the Paris Agreement published by Oxford University⁷⁰, in particular Chapter 2.B of this handbook that deals with the emerging role of non-state parties under the UN Climate Regime.⁷¹
To find the start of the emerging important role of non-state parties in the UN climate regime, one has to go back to 2011. In 2011, during the annual UN conference, the 196 countries which have signed the UN Climate Agreement, set out two parallel workstreams. Both workstreams were deemed necessary to achieve a fully negotiated agreement in Paris in 2015.
Workstream 1 concerned the determination of the parameters for the further negotiations of the Paris Agreement.
Workstream 2 concerned the route that was to ensure that prior to 2020 there would be a much greater emissions reduction. This means to say that a much stronger emissions reduction would have to take place than that which could be expected for 2020 on the basis of the reduction promises made in 2010 by the contracting states.
Consequently, it was already completely clear in 2011 that there was a substantial emissions gap between these collective state reduction promises on the one part, and what would actually collectively have to be reduced by the states by 2020 on the other. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) had made this emissions gap visible in its Emissions Gap reports of 2010 and 2011. Workstream 2 was to ensure that this emissions gap would be closed as quickly as possible to prevent dangerous climate change.
In 2012, in the further elaboration of Workstream 2, the countries came to the conclusion that in order to close the emissions gap, active climate action of non-state parties would also be necessary. As of that time greater weight was attributed to climate action of non-state parties like cities, companies and investors. They would equally independently and more specifically focus on, inter alia, energy efficiency and renewable energy. From that moment on, this approach has been promoted in all kinds of ways in Work Pathway 2, including through the so-called Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA), which was established in 2014 under UN auspices.

The intention of this non-state actor zone is to promote and highlight the climate action of cities, companies, investors and others, so that a second action agenda is created in addition to that of the nation states themselves.
The non-state climate action has been communicated as of that moment in 2014 as one of the four pillars for closing the emissions gap. The other three pillars were the concluding of an ambitious climate agreement in Paris, ambitious climate action of the affiliated countries and the mobilising of public and private finances for climate action.
All of this ultimately led to a large conference being organised in 2014 by the UN secretary general in Lima, Peru, in which, in addition to the countries affiliated with the UN, the directors of the large companies and banks and leaders from other public and private sectors were gathered. The central goal of that High Level meeting with the applicable name "the Lima Call for Climate Action" was to create a flywheel of state and non-state climate action so that the emissions gap could be closed in time. Because of the private and other non-state initiatives which arose due to the Lima conference with regard to, inter alia, sustainable energy, energy efficiency and the access to more private capital for the transition, an important momentum arose which has contributed to the state parties having been able to reach an agreement in Paris.
The role of the non-state parties, i.e. the Non-Party Stakeholders has also been recognised in the Paris Decision, in which the Paris Agreement was adopted. As already discussed in the summons (para. 708), in the beginning of the Paris Decision and under the heading "Non-Party Stakeholders" in paragraphs 134 and 135 it was indicated by the contracting parties (quote):
The Conference of the Parties" [..]
1. Welcomes the efforts of all non-Party stakeholders to address and respond to climate change, including those of civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational ' authorities;
2. Invites the Non-Party stakeholders referred to in paragraph 134 above to scale up their efforts and support actions to reduce emissions [..] and demonstrate these efforts via the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform referred to in paragraph 117 above;
The countries thus not only welcomed the climate approach of companies in the Paris Decision, they also invited the companies to further scale up their climate approach and to demonstrate this scaling up via the previously cited Non-State Actor Zone. The idea behind the demonstration and consequently making visible of non-state climate action is that consequently other state and non-state parties are again encouraged to take farther-reaching climate action, resulting in a flywheel effect.
According to the handbook on the Paris Agreement, the significance of non-state action to achieve the Paris goals has become undeniably large and crucial since then. This is also recognised by UNEP in its report of 2018:

Global climate change governance is diversifying rapidly: in recent years, political attention has been acknowledging the increasingly important role of non-state and subnational actors. [NSAs].⁷²
In this context, UNEP also refers to the run-up to the Paris Agreement and the Paris Decree as the moments when it has become clear that the countries need the upscaling of climate action by non-state actors in order to achieve the climate goals:

In sum, the process leading up to the Paris Agreement and the outcomes of Decision 1/CP.21 have paved the way for an increasingly prominent role for NSAs under the climate regime to support Parties in reaching the mitigation and adaptation goals.⁷³
According to UNEP there is also a very great potential for emission reductions to be realised by companies and other non-state parties themselves:

The emission reduction potential from NSAs is large and could, if fully implemented, contribute significantly to bridging the 2030 emissions gap. However, realizing this potential requires commitments and action that go far beyond current pledges made by individual actors or single initiatives, and implies the scaling up of multiple initiatives across sectors and regions.⁷⁴
The potential for closing the emissions gap before 2030 if the non-state actors take much farther-reaching climate action and bring about a flywheel effect within their industries or regions is thus substantial. According to UNEP the value of non-state climate action, moreover, goes much further than merely the emissions reductions which the non-state actors manage to achieve themselves in this respect. I quote UNEP:

Non-state and subnational actors provide important contributions to climate action beyond their quantified emission reductions. They build confidence in governments concerning climate policy and push for more ambitious national goals.⁷⁵
The knife cuts two ways according to UNEP. In addition to the fact that non-state parties reduce their own emissions, they make it possible for states to tackle more ambitious goals themselves. When states know that others are sharing the load, it becomes easier to achieve their national goals and therefore also easier to show more ambition.
A Research Paper of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which has been submitted into the proceedings as Exhibit 272 also confirms this, quote:

politically, measures implemented by sub-state/non-state actors can help national governments to implement existing targets faster and more effectively, while helping to build political support for more ambitious climate action.⁷⁶
Every action in conformity with the Paris Agreement on the part of important non-state parties like RDS may thus be expected to produce a flywheel effect so that countries and other parties will be able to and will dare to show more climate ambition. The reverse naturally also applies, as long as RDS only wishes to remain a growing oil and gas company, there will be no flywheel effect, but a ball and chain effect in relation to the global climate task which the countries have set for themselves. This also makes it clear why non-state climate action, and certainly non-state climate action of the big multinational oil and gas companies is crucial for being able to achieve the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement. The coming ten years are crucial in this respect and that is what I would like to discuss now.

The coming ten years are crucial

It appears from what has been discussed above, that from the first UNEP Emissions Gap report of 2010 onward it was clear that large extra reduction efforts would have to be made prior to 2020 to close the emissions gap and consequently prevent dangerous climate change.
As already clarified in the statement of 6 November by Milieudefensie et al., UNEP has subsequently pointed out every year since 2010 that the emission gap is widening because year on year global emissions have continued to increase. The consequence of this is that global emissions have never been higher than in 2019.
In 2010 [annual global emissions were a good deal lower than now. If the global emissions had been reduced as of 2010, the reduction task would therefore also have been a good deal easier. It is easier to hit the net zero emissions from a lower global emissions level than from a higher emissions level. If steps had already been taken on the road toward net zero emissions as of 2010, we would already have 10 years' progress in this task. We would have had 10 years extra to achieve an easier goal. This double benefit was lost in the past 10 years and is now leading to double loss. The task has now not only become more difficult, we have 10 years less time to achieve our goals.
The conclusion is therefore that now, in 2020, a whole decade has been lost, making the task more difficult and the chances for preventing dangerous climate change have decreased. UNEP says the following about this in its report of 2019:

[D]espite a decade of increased focus on climate change, global GHG emissions have not been curbed and the emissions gap is now larger than ever. It is clear that the world cannot afford another decade lost. Unless mitigation action and ambition are increased immediately and profoundly [..] it will not be possible to avoid exceeding the 1.5˚C goal, and it will become increasingly challenging to achieve the well below 2˚C goal.⁷⁷
UNEP then makes it clear how much more difficult the task has become since then because of this lost decade: if the global emissions reduction had commenced in 2010, then for a 2˚C scenario an annual reduction of 0.7% would have been enough. For a 1.5˚C scenario an annual reduction of 3.3% would have sufficed. However, because a whole decade was lost, according to UNEP the reduction percentage to be achieved annually has now increased for a 2˚C scenario from 0.7% to 2.7%. For the 1.5˚C scenario the annual reduction percentage to be achieved has increased from 3.3% to 7.6%.⁷⁸
The reduction percentages which have to be achieved year on year from now on to get to global net zero emissions in time, are thus very challenging. Every year that the reduction task is further postponed, makes achieving the 1.5˚C as good as impossible. If a drastic change in course does not occur, the 1.5˚C warming up could, according to the IPCC, be reached around 2030 and no later than in 2050.⁷⁹
That not only, if the change in course is not immediately embarked upon, the concentration level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will, according to the IPCC, pass the point of 450 ppm in 2030.Without a drastic tilt, we will therefore also pass the concentration level in 2030 that must not be exceeded in order to limit global warming to 2 ̊C. This has already been explained in detail in the summons.⁸⁰
The global task before us is thus enormous. The fact that in the crucial decade between 2010 and 2020 global emissions have gone up instead of down, also has to do with the attitude and strategies of the large oil and gas companies like RDS. The absolute critical point we are at now, in 2020, has been reached due to the lack of climate action of both the richest countries and the richest global energy companies.
I am mentioning the richest countries and the richest global energy companies, because on the basis of the UN Climate Convention and the Paris Agreement, it is completely clear that in the past decade the developed countries should have taken the lead to achieve the global emissions task in 2020. That is also the reason why the Dutch state has been sentenced to a minimum emission reduction of 25% by 2020. However, this emissions reduction by 2020 should not only have occurred in the Netherlands, but in all developed countries. The task for developing countries was of a completely different and much smaller magnitude, as explained in the statement of 6 November.⁸¹
The fact that these reductions have not taken place to a sufficient degree in the developed countries is also largely due to the attitude and behaviour of RDS and the other large oil and gas companies. Together with their industry associations they are active precisely in the EU, the United States, Canada and Australia. Precisely in the biggest economies within the group of the developed countries, this fossil power block has lobbied against effective climate measures.
Precisely in this richest part of the world, which since 1992 has bound itself through conventions vis-a-vis other states to take the leadership in reducing the climate problem, this fossil power block used all its economic and political power and billions of dollars for lobby and PR campaigns to protect their business model. In the parts of the world where the start of the global energy transition should have taken place, they were able to halt that transition. By doing so they contributed to a significant degree to the fact that in 2020, almost 30 years after the concluding of the UN Climate Convention of 1992, the world has ended up in a very precarious situation.
The average temperature of the earth has in the meantime increased by 1˚C. A warming up of 1.5˚C is already almost impossible to prevent and even limiting the warming up to well under 2˚C has in the meantime become very challenging. With regard to the approach to dangerous climate change, it truly is "five to midnight". It is December 2020, and we are entering the last decade in which dangerous climate change can still be prevented. If the emissions are not drastically reduced in the coming decade, then the race is over.
National governments that wanted and want to regulate have been and are being obstructed by the oil and gas industry to such degree that a rapid and effective impulse for the energy transition is as good as excluded in the short term. Every week RDS or its lobbyists in the most important political centres of the world sit down with the highest officials to secure the interests of its business model. As John Ruggie has indicated, citizens have no role of any significance in this power play and trade unions and NGOs are outnumbered 30-fold in these centres by the business community.⁸²
The regulation of the oil and gas industry has not only turned out to be ineffective on a national scale for all the reasons discussed. Also on a global scale it is not possible to easily achieve effective regulation, according to John Ruggie. According to Ruggie, on a global scale the regulatory framework for regulating multinational companies is too fragile and incomplete, which is why there is a governance gap.⁸³
Furthermore, the consumer also barely registers in this power play. The biggest global energy players offer the consumer in 2020 no or hardly any sustainable alternatives, but virtually only fossil fuels. RDS alone annually invests some 20 to 30 billion dollars in new fossil infrastructure. Other fossil companies do precisely the same thing. If nation states have their wings clipped and the consumer is offered almost no alternatives, how can we prevent dangerous climate change?
According to John Ruggie this leaves two options. Either we hope that multinational companies come to their senses and engage in self-regulation, or a universal convention has to be established in which multinational companies are regulated. Ruggie does not expect much from either alternative.
With regard to self-regulation, he wonders how this can ensure that the abundance of lobbying activities of multinationals is counteracted. In addition, he wonders how self-regulation can combat multinational companies from continuing to put pressure on regulatory initiatives of states. Ruggie expects that self-regulation, even under the most ideal circumstances, will not provide an adequate answer to these questions.⁸⁴
The establishing of a universal convention to internationally regulate the conduct of multinationals is, according to Ruggie, in fact doomed to fail in advance. Even if it was only on purely practical grounds because according to him this would require worldwide harmonisation of national legal system, at least in important areas of law such as commercial law, company law, financial law, tax law, consumer law and competition law. He believes that the solution to closing the governance gap will not be found here.⁸⁵
I realise that this is a sombre analysis.
But there is also a light at the end of the tunnel. Ruggie hints that the way out of this impasse could be found in the application of international soft law such as the UN Guiding Principles in national legal systems. Ruggie believes that soft law can be converted into hard law at a case-specific level.⁸⁶ [And that is precisely the route which Milieudefensie et al. also sees as the last escape route and why it has brought this action.
The escape route for breaking through the current status quo which will probably lead to dangerous climate change, must indeed be sought in legal cases such as this one. With application of the open standard of the societal duty of care as the basis for the claim of wrongful act, the District Court can weigh up all facts and circumstances. In addition to human rights law and the legal rules relating to endangerment, the District Court can also attribute value to the fact that RDS has committed itself to the international soft law rules as laid down in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
Against this background I would like to put the following two questions to the District Court. If this District Court does not apply the law and intervene now, who will? And if this District Court were not to intervene now, then when?
In connection with these two questions, I would like to briefly explain to the court in conclusion of this opening argument that human rights law and the UN Guiding Principles also allow courts to regulate the extraterritorial activities of head offices of multinational companies, at least if these activities lead to violations of human rights . The sole condition is that there is jurisdiction.⁸⁷
The UN Guiding Principles indicate that some agencies of human rights conventions also recommend that home states regulate the extraterritorial activities of the head offices based in their territory if human rights are under pressure. This is, inter alia, because of the universal character of human rights. The UN Guiding Principles assert in this respect in the explanatory notes:

Within these parameters some human rights treaty bodies recommend that Home states take steps to prevent abuse abroad by business enterprises within their jurisdiction.⁸⁸
An example of a human rights agency which calls for these steps is the UN Economic Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights. This agency sees to compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
This UN human rights committee (the Committee) stated in 2017 in its General Comment no. 24 that compliance with this international human rights convention means that home states must prevent that the companies which are based within their jurisdiction, are guilty of extraterritorial human rights violations.⁸⁹
The UN Human Rights Committee comes to this conclusion because the contracting states have committed themselves to each other via Article 2 paragraph 1 of the ICESCR Convention to ensure, both independently and within the framework of international aid and cooperation, that the full realization of the recognized human rights is achieved. According to the Committee, a contracting state remaining passive if a company based in its territory were to be guilty of extraterritorial human rights violations or foreseeable extraterritorial human rights violations does not align with that provision.
The UN human rights committee refers to Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations in which the states have undertaken, together with the United Nations, to promote universal respect for and observance of the rights of man and the fundamental freedoms for all. In addition, the human rights committee points out that customary international law prohibits a state from using its territory or allowing it to be used to cause damage to the territory of another state. According to the Committee, failing to intervene would be contrary to the "no-harm" principle. ⁹⁰
The consequence of international law and international human rights law is consequently, according to the Committee, that if a state can exert control over international activities of a company based in its territory, extra territorial obligations would arise to use that control in a manner which promotes respect for universal human rights.⁹¹
The Committee explicitly points out in this regard that all parts of the State, including the judiciary and the standing magistracy, are bound by the Convention and that the State is obliged to inform judges and lawyers in particular about the human rights obligations that the Convention entails in regulating business activities and ensuring that they can perform their functions in complete independence.⁹²
According to the Committee, the imposition of human rights obligations by states on companies which have a seat in their territory does not mean that these states would consequently be guilty of enforcing extraterritorial jurisdiction.⁹³ [The imposing of human rights obligations does not infringe the sovereignty of other countries. Human rights are universal and require universal protection. Milieudefensie et al.'s claim can be directly imposed. This is logical, because the claim is a national measure against RDS which falls fully within the jurisdiction of the District Court. This will of course be further clarified in the International Private Law part of the oral arguments.
In short, the imposition by the court of human rights obligations on Dutch parent companies because of the control they have over their international group companies, is completely permissible because the Dutch courts have jurisdiction to do so.
In the framework of its judicial task, this District Court has jurisdiction to intervene pursuant to Article 296 Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code. The claimants believe that the time for intervention has truly arrived. There will be no other or better time. In a few years it will be too late and it will no longer be possible to prevent a warming up of 1.5˚C.
If the political arena, when confronted with powerful private globally operating economic superpowers, finds it difficult to regulate quickly and effectively and if the Court too decided not to intervene, who then will protect the citizens? Who will protect the citizens whose human rights will evidently be violated due to dangerous climate change? Who will then protect the environment and nature against the evident worldwide destruction to come if companies like RDS can continue to operate as they are doing? Who will then protect the poorest in the world who will no longer be able to escape poverty due to dangerous climate change? And who will protect future generations who will inherit an earth from us which is seriously damaged and has been left in ruins?
For all these reasons the claimants feel they have an extraordinarily great responsibility to solve the climate problem. This responsibility weighs heavily on them because, at the same time, they feel powerless. Anyone who knows what is going on and who knows that it really is two to twelve, will carry this knowledge with them daily, but also know that this problem will never be solved if the greatest polluters in the world continue to work against and refuse to commit to the global climate goal. This is what makes this case so very important to each of the claimants.
On behalf of the claimants I will therefore in the following parts of the multi-day oral arguments do my utmost to show the Court that all legal frameworks and facts and circumstances indicate that the claim can be awarded and that there is nothing standing in the way of awarding the claim. I will suffice with this for the moment.

Counsel

Summons, para. 552 ↩
Statement of 6 November 2020, para. 29 ↩
Summons, Chapter XI ↩
See UN Climate Convention under Articles 2 and 3 (Exhibit 96) ↩
See Paris Agreement, Article 2 (Exhibit 145) ↩
See UN Climate Convention under Articles 2 and 3 (Exhibit 96) and Paris Agreement, Article 2 (Exhibit 145) ↩
Exhibits 316 and 317 ↩
See inter alia paragraph 30 of RDS' statement of defence ↩
See inter alia footnote 1 of RDS' statement of defence ↩
See inter alia paragraph 93 of RDS' statement of defence ↩
See inter alia paragraph 96 of RDS' statement of defence and ↩
See inter alia paragraph 93 of RDS' statement of defence ↩
See inter alia paragraph 97 of RDS' statement of defence ↩
Page 4 of the CDP statement (Exhibit 315) ↩
Ibid ↩
See inter alia paras. 101 et seq. of RDS' statement of defence ↩
Page 4 of the CDP statement (Exhibit 315) ↩
Page 4 of the CDP statement (Exhibit 315) ↩
See inter alia RDS 2019 Annual Report, p. 9 (Exhibit 314) ↩
P. 43 CDP statement (Exhibit 315) ↩
See inter alia Milieudefensie's summons, paras. 577-580 ↩
Ibid ↩
Page 26, 2019 Annual Report (Exhibit 314) ↩
Page 43 of the CDP statement (Exhibit 315) ↩
Page 11 of the CDP statement (Exhibit 315) ↩
See NOS news item 'Shell gaat drastisch reorganiseren zeker 7000 banen verdwijnen' ↩
Summons, paragraphs 565 et seq. ↩
Page 13 of the CDP statement (Exhibit 315) ↩
Pages 29 and 30, 2019 Annual Report (Exhibit 314) ↩
2019 Annual Report, p. 169 (Exhibit 314) ↩
2019 Annual Report, p. 169 (Exhibit 314) ↩
P. 236, 2019 Annual Report ↩
Summons, para. 691-715 ↩
Exhibit 273, pp. 321-323 ↩
Ibid ↩
Exhibit RO-90, p. 7 footnote and pp. 24-42 for the many industry associations of which RDS is a member. ↩
Exhibit 329 ↩
Exhibit RO-90 ↩
Exhibit 315, see inter alia pp. 178, 180, 186, 188, 189 for board positions in these industry associations ↩
Exhibit 329 with reference to the research which has been submitted as Exhibit 330 ↩
Exhibit RO-90, p. 7 footnote and pp. 24-42 ↩
Exhibit 328, p. 2, p.10 ↩
Exhibit 273, p. 323 ↩
Exhibit 273, p. 323 ↩
See, for example 'Een sms je liet al het harde werk van rutte in de soep lopen' ↩
Exhibit 324, p. 99 ↩
Exhibit 324, pp. 90 and 91 ↩
Summons, para. 581-585, see also ↩
Exhibit 324, p. 91 ↩
Exhibit 324, p. 92 ↩
Exhibit 324, p. 88 and p. 92 ↩
Exhibit 326 ↩
Exhibit 325, p. 12 box 3. ↩
Exhibit 314, p. 72 ↩
Exhibit 314, p. 72 ↩
Exhibit 328, p. 12 ↩
Exhibit 328, p. 12 ↩
Exhibit 324, p. 99 ↩
Exhibit 324, p. 99 in conjunction with p. 88 ↩
Exhibit 324, p. 99 ↩
Statement of 6 November 2020, para. 29 ↩
Statement of 6 November 2020, para. 28 ↩
Exhibit 319, p. 2 ↩
Exhibit 319, pp. 2-4 ↩
Exhibit 319, p. 4 ↩
Exhibit 328, p. 11 ↩
Summons, paras. 691-710 ↩
Summons, para. 586-588 ↩
Summons, para. 575-608, statement of 6 November 2020, paras. 21-32 ↩
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change, Analysis and Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2017 ↩
Ibid, Chapter 2.B Pre-2020 Climate Action and the Emergent Role of Non-party Stakeholders. ↩
UNEP, The role of non-state and subnational actors, Exhibit 271, p. 6 ↩
UNEP, The role of non-state and subnational actors, Exhibit 271, p. 7 ↩
UNEP, The role of non-state and subnational actors, Exhibit 271, p. 6 ↩
UNEP, The role of non-state and subnational actors, Exhibit 271, p. 5 ↩
Chatham House, the Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes, Exhibit 272, p. 1 ↩
UNEP Emissions Gap 2019, Exhibit 274, Ch. 1, p. 1 ↩
UNEP Emissions Gap 2019, Exhibit 274, p. xx ↩
IPCC, SPM SR15, 2018, p. 4, Exhibit 135. ↩
Summons, para. 329 in conjunction with paras. 31-36, 42, 46, 48, 55, 729-756. See also the statement of 6 November, paras. 25-28 ↩
See also statement of 6 November, paras. 15-16 ↩
Exhibit 273, p. 322 ↩
Exhibit 273, pp. 317 and 329 ↩
Exhibit 273, p. 329 ↩
Exhibit 273, p. 329 ↩
Exhibit 272, p. 329 ↩
UNGP Article 2 and Commentary for Article 2, Exhibit 219 (Dutch version) and Exhibit 220 (original English version) ↩
Ibid ↩
United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, general comment\ Nor. 24 (2017) on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities, paragraphs 25 and 26 ↩
Ibid, paragraph 27 ↩
Ibid, paragraph 28 ↩
Ibid, paragraph 47 ↩
Ibid, paragraph 33 ↩

District Court of The Hague​

Opening arguments​

RDS determines the climate and transition policy of the Shell group​

Making identified transition risks manageable by means of such things lobby and PR activities​

The important role of non-state parties under the UN climate regime​

The coming ten years are crucial​

Footnotes​